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INTERPRETING TITLE VII: THE DISCORD
BETWEEN LEGISPRUDENCE AND JURISPRUDENCE
AND ITS IMPACT ON SMALL BUSINESSES
MICHAEL W. DISOTELL*
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress and the United States Supreme Court have engaged in a
discordant "call and response" form of communication that often pits
congressional intent against judicial interpretation. In the civil rights arena,
Congress has been particularly willing to abrogate the Court's
jurisprudence when judicial decisions are unpopular with a large majority
of the American public.2 At the same time, the Roberts Court has
maintained a stalwart skepticism towards Congress' civil rights
legisprudence.3
This dysfunctional relationship is best highlighted when the Court
interprets the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Civil Rights Act) and its
section prohibiting workplace discrimination, Title VII. Most recently, the
Court decided two Title VII cases during its 2012 October Term with
enormous implications for employer liability. In the first case, Vance v. Ball
State University, the Court held that an employee is a "supervisor" for
vicarious liability purposes only if the employer authorized the individual to
take tangible employment actions against the victim. 4 In the second case,
University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, the Court held
that an employer is only liable for retaliation against an employee if
discrimination was the but-for cause of the employee's termination.5 Both
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expected 2014; Bachelor of Arts in English, Westminster College, 2011. The
author thanks his mother, father, and brother for their support during the course of
this project and also gives special thanks to Adam V. Buente and Professor L.
Camille H6bert for their advice on revisions.
1 See William G. Buss, An Essay on Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the
Demise of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 83 IowA L. REV. 391, 394-96
! 1998) (discussing the strained relationship between Congress and the Court).
See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), superseded by statute,
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012); Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by statute, Lilly
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (2012).
3 "Legisprudence" is a relatively new term used in academia that analyzes how
Congress accounts for judicial interpretation and existing legal frameworks when
considering a bill. Editors'Note on "Legisprudence ", B.U. L. REV. 423, 424
(2009).
133 S. Ct. 2434, 2439 (2013).
5 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2534 (2013).
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cases, decided along partisan lines with Justice Anthony Kennedy providing
the deciding vote each time, narrow the scope of protection afforded to
employees. Focusing on employees' diminished workplace rights, Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg penned two scathing dissents calling on Congress to
"correct" the Court's interpretation through subsequent legislation.6
Given Congress' track record in overturning the Court's civil rights
jurisprudence, Congress may very well listen to Ginsburg's pleas. When
Congress takes such action, though, it often overlooks a critical sector of
the American economy: the small business community. Because of their
insular positions in the capital markets and difficulties allocating resources
to combat discrimination charges, small businesses are affected by the
discord between Congress' and the Court's relationship to a much greater
extent than large corporations.
This Comment focuses solely on the collateral impact the discord
between Congress' legisprudence and the Court's jurisprudence creates on
small businesses; it does not weigh the merits of whether Congress should
abrogate the Court's decisions. Part II lays the foundation of Title VII's
legisprudence while Part III summarizes Title VII's jurisprudence. Part IV
discusses the Court's recent Vance and Nassar decisions in-depth, including
Ginsburg's dual dissents. Next, Part V analyzes the implications the rulings
will have on the small business community, concluding that the decisions
will ultimately benefit small business entrepreneurs. Part VI then offers
advice to small business general counsel and outside counsel with small
business clients (collectively, "small business counsel") who must apply
these rulings to employer workplace policies. Part VII concludes.
II. TITLE VII'S PASSAGE AND RELEVANT PROVISIONS
A. The Civil Rights Act of 1964
After the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of
Education,7 civil rights advocates like Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. pushed
for greater liberties that would prohibit discrimination outside of the public
school context.8 As race relations deteriorated during the 1960s, President
John F. Kennedy announced that he would send a sweeping civil rights
reform bill to Congress. 9 Skeptics believed the bill would reach the same
6 Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2455 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2534
tGinsburg, J., dissenting).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8 WELLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 2-3 (4th ed. 2007) (chronicling
the tribulations of the Civil Rights Movement).
9 Id. at 3. Kennedy stated, "The heart of the question is whether all Americans are
to be afforded equal rights and equal opportunities, whether we are going to treat
our fellow Americans as we want to be treated." Id.
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demise earlier civil rights bills had experienced: in 1957, a Senate filibuster
had blocked the passage of similar civil rights legislation while Senate
Democrats in 1960 largely defanged a bill by successfully deleting
provisions regarding education, employment and housing equality.'0
After President Kennedy's assassination, though, and an ensuing
legislative battle," the 1964 incarnation of the Civil Rights Act passed
through both Houses of Congress and was signed into law by President
Lyndon B. Johnson on July 2, 1964.12 The landmark act outlawed, among
other practices, unequal application of voter registration requirements,
discrimination in public accommodations and discrimination in the
workplace. 13 This last provision, known as Title VII, created the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)14 to enforce the
prohibitions on workplace harassment through "conference, conciliation
and persuasion."'15 Importantly, Title VII would not have been passed
without the support of legislators from both chambers who were wary of
federal regulation in private business. 16 As a result, management
prerogatives were left largely undisturbed as a price for their support. 17
B. Title VII's Relevant Provisions
Title VII makes it unlawful "for an employer . to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his ... employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."' 18 An "employer"
is anyone who "has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each
of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year,
and any agent of such a person."' 9 Title VII contains two antidiscrimination
provisions. The first provision relates to status-based discrimination, which
prohibits an employer from discriminating against a protected class in the
form of demotion, termination, salary reduction and the like.20 The second
provision involves remedy-based discrimination, which prohibits an
employer from retaliating against an employee who has opposed,
complained of or sought remedies regarding workplace discrimination.2 '
'
0 Id. at4.
1 See id. at 38 (discussing the unorthodox manner in which the Civil Rights Act
was passed).
12id
13 id.
14 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (2012) (outlining the EEOC's creation and
composition).
'" Id. § 2000e-5(b) (outlining the EEOC's enforcement responsibilities).
16 H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 29 (1963).
171 d.
18 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
19 Id. § 2000e(b).
20 See id. § 2000e-2(a).
21 See id § 2000e-3(a).
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The provision pertaining to status-based discrimination was enacted
as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (1991 Act), which sought to revise
parts of several federal antidiscrimination statutes.22 The amendments were
meant to bolster the Civil Rights Act's original scope and to respond to
several decisions by the Court that many in Congress believed sharply
curtailed the effectiveness of antidiscrimination laws. 3 However, Congress
for some reason failed to amend Title VII's remedy-based discrimination
provision.
Furthermore, despite Title VII's specific textual provisions, it does
not define key terms such as "discrimination" and "hostile work
environment. 24 Some of these lexicological gaps were intentionally left to
the courts and the EEOC to define.25 In crafting workable definitions for
these terms, courts eventually applied agency theories of liability.
26
III. TITLE VII'S JURISPRUDENCE
A. Courts'Early Interpretations and Evolving Theories of Liability
Courts struggled to interpret the scope of Title VII after its
enactment, and its shifting theories of liability can be separated into three
distinct eras: the 1960s, the 1970s and the 1980s to present. As courts tried
to import modem theories of agency law into the Title VII arena, though,
their interpretations often raised more questions than they answered. A brief
summary of these periods will help frame the discussion of how the Court
has come to view employer liability today.
1. Courts in the 1960s Focused on Corporate Policies
Initially, Title VII litigants challenged corporate policies that were
either facially discriminatory or facially neutral which nevertheless
produced a disparate impact.27 Overall, very few Title VII plaintiffs alleged
discrimination by an employer's agent.2s Court interpretations began to
arrange themselves along a spectrum almost immediately. Some circuit
22 See Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
23 H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 2-4 (1991) (Conf. Rep.) (citing, among others,
Lorance v. AT&T Tech., Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989) (holding that an alleged
disparate impact caused by a seniority system requires a showing of discriminatory
intent) and Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (holding that
employers do not have to justify racial disparity by proving business necessity)).
24 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
25 Courts have generally defined "discrimination" to mean any action that produces
direct economic harm, such as terminating, demoting or reducing an individual's
salary on account of that employee's protected status. See Vance v. Ball State
Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2440 (2013).
26 Cf Sandra F. Sperino, A Modern Theory of Direct Corporate Liability for Title
VII, 61 ALA. L. REv. 773, 774 (2010).
27 Id.
2 8Id. at 777.
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courts interpreted Title VII's antidiscrimination mandate broadly to hold
employers liable for practices that also produced indirect economic
consequences, such as corporate policies that tolerated hostile work
environments. 29 Others began to hold employers liable for hostile
workplaces if they knew or reasonably should have known about employee
harassment but failed to act.30 Generally, though, the circuit courts applied a
negligence theory of liability.31 Their decisions rarely discussed strict and
vicarious liability.
32
2. Courts in the 1970s Shifted to Agency Principles of
Liability
In 1972, Congress granted the EEOC the ability to file suit in
federal court after conciliation efforts failed.33 However, the EEOC faced
two internal problems that diminished its ability to carry out Congress' will:
(1) logistical impediments from being severely underfunded and
understaffed 34 and (2) ideological impediments from being plagued by
some of its own internal prejudices towards protected classes. These
hurdles forty years ago helped shape the current theories of employer
liability applied by the courts today. For instance, the EEOC in its early
years often ignored complaints by female litigants alleging sexual
harassment because the agency considered them meritless.35 As a result,
female litigants by-passed EEOC involvement and began flocking directly
to the courts instead.36
Also, for the first time Title VII claimants alleged that employers
were responsible for the misconduct of their employees, and courts
responded by applying a vicarious model of liability to employers.37
However, courts began to diverge drastically on which actions would
impute employer liability, falling into three basic categories. 38 Some courts
29 See, e.g., Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971); see also Meritor
Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-66 (1986) (analyzing the evolution of hostile
workplace claims).
30 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 768-69 (1998) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (citing cases).
31 id.
32 Sperino, supra note 26, at 777.
13 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2012).
34 Nathan C. Sprague, Is the Honeymoon Over? The Fate of the EEOC and the
Early Right-to-Sue Letter, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 572, 576 (2000).
35 BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 290 (2009).36 id.
37 Sperino, supra note 26.
38 Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme
Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 290 (1997).
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liberally held employers liable even for isolated acts of discrimination.3 9
Others held employers liable only if the employer was either unaware of the
harassment or failed to correct it once the harassment did occur.40 Still,
others only held employers liable if their corporate policies sanctioned such
harassment.41 Mainly, though, federal and state courts during this period
injected an agency theory of liability into their Title VII analyses.
3. The Court in the 1980s Blesses the Agency Theory
As the lower courts modified their liability approaches, the
Supreme Court finally turned its attention to workplace discrimination. In
its first related case, the Court held that sexual harassment was an
actionable claim under Title VII. 42 In another case, the Court held that an
employer could not be vicariously liable for an agent's misconduct when
those actions clearly opposed an employer's good faith efforts to comply
with Title VII.4'3 Thus, although the Court anointed the vicarious liability
standard, it remained silent on the issue of whether an employee using his
position of authority created employer liability.
44
B. The Court Ties Liability to Supervisory Status
Eventually, the Court answered this open question when it decided
the twin cases of Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth45 and Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton.4 In creating the "EllerthIFaragher framework," the
Court incorporated the evolving theories of agency law that had developed
in the lower courts for the past three decades. Under the Ellerth/Faragher
framework, an employer is vicariously liable for a hostile work
environment if the harassing employee was a supervisor who could take
tangible employment action against the victim. 47 If the employee was not a
supervisor, the plaintiffs claim proceeded under a negligence standard.48
39 See, e.g., Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157, 159-60 (S.D. Ohio 1976)
holding an employer liable for a supervisor's racial slurs against an employee).
o See, e.g., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("[S]hould a
supervisor contravene employer policy without the employer's knowledge and the
consequences are rectified when discovered, the employer may be relieved from
responsibility under Title VII.") (footnotes omitted).
41 See, e.g., Croker v. Boeing Co. (Vertol Div.), 437 F. Supp. 1138, 1191 (E.D. Pa.
1977) (relieving an employer of liability for an employee's unwanted sexual
advances towards a co-worker because the employer had a policy against co-
workers dating).
42 Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
43 Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 544 (1999).
44 See id.
4' 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
46 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
47 See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2441 (2013).48 Id.
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1. An Overview of Ellerth and Faragher, and the Court's
Inductive Reasoning
Ellerth and Faragher both involved sexual harassment claims by
female employees against their immediate bosses. 49 At the outset, the Court
acknowledged that employers were typically not liable for the acts of their
agents when those actions were taken outside the scope of one's
employment.5 ° Aware that the workplace had evolved to a point where no
employer actually authorized workplace harassment any more, though, the
Court applied an agency law exception that imputed liability when the
agent "aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency
relation."'
The Court reasoned that the employees most likely to abuse their
status within the company were supervisors who could take "tangible
employment action"5 2 against an employee, which the Court further defined
as "a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing
to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a
decision causing a significant change in benefits." 53 That is, when a
supervisor took a tangible employment action against an employee, the
plaintiff's injury could not have resulted but-for the supervisor's status of
authority given to him by the employer.14 Furthermore, tangible
employment actions were often official company acts recorded in an
employer's business logs and subject to review by higher-level
management. 55
2. The Ellerth/Faragher Framework
Thus, in those situations where the supervisor took tangible
employment action, the Court found it appropriate to apply strict liability. 6
But when a supervisor's harassment was not the result of a tangible
employment action, the employer would still be vicariously liable if it could
not establish an affirmative defense.57 Specifically, an employer could
avoid liability if: (1) it exercised reasonable care to prevent or correct
harassment; or (2) the victim failed to avail himself of the employer's
49 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 742; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 775.
50 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793.
51 Id. at 802-03 (citing I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1957))
(emphasis added). The Restatement (Third) of Agency has since discarded this
exception, explaining that the exception is often already satisfied by modem
theories of apparent authority and the duty of care. See 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY § 7.08 (2005).
52 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761-62.
" Faragher, 524 U.S. at 790.54 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761-62.55 id.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 763; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 803-05.
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preventive or corrective opportunities.58 Where the harassing employee was
not a supervisor, the Court would simply apply the negligence standard.59
Although Ellerth and Faragher involved sexual harassment claims, courts
applied the framework to race-based claims with equal force.60
3. The Rift Between Judicial and Agency Interpretation after
Ellerth and Faragher
The Ellerth/Faragher framework represented a compromise
between the agency principles of vicarious liability and Title VII's policy
that employers should be responsible for mitigating and preventing
workplace harassment.6' However, the Court overlooked one key point:
who was a supervisor? In the wake of the Ellerth and Faragher decisions,
the EEOC construed the term supervisor broadly, advocating for an
approach that tied supervisory status to an employee's ability to impact
another employee's daily work.62 Specifically, it classified a supervisor as
any employee who was authorized to: (1) "undertake or recommend
tangible employment decisions affecting the employee," including "hiring,
firing, promoting, demoting, and reassigning the employee;" or (2) "direct
the employee's daily work activities. 63 In devising this definition of
supervisor, the EEOC adopted the terminology found in Ellerth and
Faragher, but broadened its scope by incorporating common workplace
perceptions of manager responsibilities during a normal work day. While
several courts adopted this broad approach,64 others discarded the second
form of supervisory status as being overly broad.65 Thus, the Court in
Vance sought to resolve this circuit split.
5' Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
59 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
60 See, e.g., Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 186 n.9 (4th Cir. 2001)
(citing cases reflecting "the developing consensus is that... [Ellerth and
Faragher] apply with equal force to other types of harassment claims under Title
VII"). In applying the Ellerth/Faragher framework to Vance, discussion infra, the
Court has arguably acquiesced to this extension in judicial interpretation.61 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764.62 EEOC, Notice No. 915.002, Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer
Liability for Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors, 8 FEP Manual (BNA) 405:7651
2003) [hereinafter EEOC Guidance].
' Id. at 405:7654.
64 See, e.g., Whitten v. Fred's, Inc., 601 F.3d 231, 245-47 (4th Cir. 2010); Mack v.
Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d 116, 126-27 (2d Cir. 2003).
65 See, e.g., Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 96 (1st Cir. 2005); Weyers v.
Lear Operations Corp., 359 F.3d 1049, 1057 (8th Cir. 2004); Parkins v. Civil
Constructors of Ill., Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1033-34 n.1 (7th Cir. 1998).
66 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (plurality opinion); id. at
259 (White, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 276 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
judgment).
67 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
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C. Title VII's Anti-Retaliation Provision
While the Court was developing its employer liability theories for
employee harassment, it also struggled to interpret Title VII's anti-
retaliation provisions. 66 There are two types of wrongful employer conduct
that rely on causation standards. The first is status-based discrimination,
which prohibits employer discrimination against a protected class in hiring,
firing, salary structure and the like.67 The second involves remedy-based
discrimination, which makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate
against an employee "because he has opposed any [prohibited employer
conduct] or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated
in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing [regarding
employer discrimination]. ' '68
The Court's leading case interpreting these provisions before the
2012 Term was fractured and highly criticized. In Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, a cobbled-together group of six Justices agreed that a plaintiff
could bring a status-based discrimination claim if he proved that status in a
protected group was a "motivating" or "substantial" factor in the
employer's decision (the motivating factor standard).69 If the plaintiff did
so, the burden of proof shifted to the employer, who could defend its action
by showing that it would have engaged in the same action towards other
employees not in the protected class-that is, that its discrimination was not
the but-for cause of the action towards the employee (the burden-shifting
standard).7° In the 1991 Act amendments, Congress codified the
motivating-factor standard, adding a provision to section 2000e-2 which
stated: "[A]n unlawful employment practice is established when the
complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though
other factors also motivated the practice."71 Congress then abrogated the
burden-shifting standard.72 However, Congress did not amend the "because
of' language or causation standard for remedy-based discrimination.73
The Court in Nassar was faced with this issue of whether the
motivating-factor standard for status-based claims also applied to remedy-
based discrimination claims.74 The Court had only faced this predicament in
the Civil Rights Act's cousin, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
68 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258 (plurality opinion); id. at 259 (White, J.,
concurring in judgment); id. at 276 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).69 Id. at 258 (1989) (plurality opinion); id. at 259 (White, J., concurring in
udgment); id. at 276 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
o Id. at 258 (plurality opinion); id. at 259-60 (White, J., concurring in judgment);
id. at 276-77 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
72 See id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
71 Id. § 2000e-2(m).
74 See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2522 (2013).
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of 1967 (ADEA), which had a similar structure.75 In that case, Gross v. FBL
Financial Services, the Court held that the ADEA required but-for
76
causation to state a claim of discrimination. The Gross Court reasoned
that the ordinary meaning of "because of' had traditionally meant but-for
causation and noted that the ADEA must be "read ... the way Congress
wrote it."'77 The Gross Court also gave effect to Congress' failure to add a
provision codifying the motivating-factor standard in the ADEA. 8 Because
Congress had made other significant changes to the ADEA through the
1991 Act, the Gross Court considered the absence of a provision codifying
the motivating-factor standard a purposeful omission.79
The EEOC, on the other hand, disagreed with this interpretive
technique. Instead, it also construed remedy-based discrimination under the
broader motivating-factor standard, reasoning that "an interpretation . . .
that permits proven retaliation to go unpunished undermines the purpose of
the anti-retaliation provisions of maintaining unfettered access to the
statutory remedial mechanism.,
80
IV. THE COURT ADOPTS NARROW INTERPRETATIONS IN
VANCE AND NASSAR
A. Vance v. Ball State University
1. Background
Maetta Vance, an African-American woman, worked as a catering
assistant for Ball State University (BSU) alongside Saundra Davis, a white
employee.81 Vance believed Davis was harassing her on the job, so she
lodged complaints with BSU and the EEOC, alleging racial
discrimination. 82 When the problem was not resolved internally, Vance
filed suit in federal court8 3 Her main allegation was that BSU had created a
racially hostile work environment by allowing Davis to continue serving as
her supervisor, although she conceded that BSU did not authorize Vance to
take tangible employment actions towards Davis.84 The district court
7' 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2012).
76 557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009).
77 Id. at 176, 179; see also Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 265-
66 (1992) (defining "by reason of" as the "'but-for' cause" under the treble
damages provision of RICO).
78 Gross, 557 U.S. at 174.
79 Id
80 EEOC, Directives Transmittal No. 915.003, EEOC Compliance Manual § 8-11(1)
2003).1 Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2439 (2013).
82 Id. Specifically, Vance alleged that Davis often glared at her, slammed pots
around her and blocked her from using the elevator with Davis' catering cart. Id.
83 Id.
84 Complaint at 5-6, Vance v. Ball State Univ., No. 1:06-cv-01452-SEB-TAB (S.D.
Ind., Oct. 3, 2006).
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granted summary judgment in favor of BSU, noting that Davis was not
Vance's supervisor under the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals' narrow
interpretation, 85 and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.8 6
2. The Court Adopts a Narrow Definition of Supervisor
The Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit, holding that an
employee is a "supervisor" for Title VII vicarious liability purposes only if
the employee was authorized to take tangible employment actions against
other employees. 87 In doing so, the Court established a bright-line definition
of supervisor that rejected the EEOC's broad interpretation that included
employees who oversaw co-workers' daily work activities at various times.
Writing for the majority, Justice Samuel Alito remarked, "[T]he framework
set out in Ellerth and Faragher presupposes a clear distinction between
supervisors and co-workers. 8 To hold otherwise, Alito reasoned, would
create two categories: supervisors that have the ability to take tangible
employment action and supervisors that lack tangible employment action
ability yet still impute vicarious liability to employers simply because they
direct co-workers in their daily work routines.89 Although co-workers can
inflict psychological and physical injuries on other employees, only a
supervisor can cause direct economic harm through tangible employment
actions.90 Thus, "[t]angible employment actions are the means by which the
supervisor brings the official power of the enterprise to bear on
subordinates."'" This ability to take tangible employment actions classifies
92
one as a supervisor.
Alito determined that the lower courts' confusion of the meaning of
"supervisor" came from competing dictionary definitions93 and the EEOC's
definition that burdened employers with very divergent levels of liability.94
This contradicted other federal statutes that characterized the supervisory
status narrowly.95 Alito chided the EEOC for advocating a position that
85 Vance v. Ball State Univ., 2008 WL 4247836, at *1 (S.D. Ind., Sept. 10, 2008).
86 Vance v. Ball State Univ., 646 F.3d 461,475 (7th Cir. 2011).
87 Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2439.
88 Id. at 2443.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 2448.
91 Id. (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762 (1998))
(internal quotations marks omitted).
92 Id.
93 Id. at 2444 (comparing 17 OxFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 245 (2d ed. 1989)
(defining "supervisor" liberally as "one who inspects and directs the work of
others") with WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2296, def. 1 (a)
(1976) (defining "supervisor" conservatively as "a person having authority
delegated by an employer to hire, transfer, suspend, recall, promote, assign, or
discharge another employee or to recommend such action")).
94 Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2444.95 Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2021(18) (2012) (defining "supervisor" under the Bureau
of Indian Affairs' classification as "the individual in the position of ultimate
authority")).
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caused lower courts to engage in highly case-specific inquiries.96 Indeed,
nothing in Ellerth or Faragher even suggested the Court construed
supervisory status broadly.
97
Alito then explained how the decision squared with the modem
realities of the workplace. Specifically, the interpretation provided a bright-
line test that could be easily applied to summary judgment, trial stages and
jury instructions.98 The EEOC's broad standard, on the other hand, would
require examination of "nebulous" factors, such as: what constitutes
"sufficient authority"; what weight should be given to retaliatory acts; and
how often the employee exercised supervisory authority.99 This would force
employers to walk a tight rope to avoid liability because it is nearly
impossible for an employer to determine those factors beforehand.00
Applying this narrow definition of supervisor, the Court held that
Davis' duties at BSU were insufficient to make her Vance's supervisor.1 '
Davis could not fire, demote, assign daily tasks or take any other tangible
employment action that could cause have caused Vance direct economic
harm. 10 2 Therefore, BSU was not vicariously liable for Davis' actions.
103
3. The Four Dissenters
Ginsburg's dissent, joined by three other Justices, was unabashedly
frank in calling on Congress to abrogate the majority's decision. Ginsburg
accused the majority of neglecting the "all-too-plain reality" that employees
with the ability to control other workers sometimes use their position of
authority to create a hostile workplace.' 4 She opined, "The limitation the
Court decrees diminishes the force of Faragher and Ellerth, ignores the
conditions under which members of the work force labor, and disserves the
objective of Title VII to prevent discrimination from infecting the Nation's
workplaces.""1 5 As a defiant Ginsburg explained:
Exposed to a fellow employee's harassment, one can walk
away or tell the offender to "buzz off." A supervisor's
96 Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2443.
17 Id. at 2446.
98 Id. at 2444, 2449 ("In a great many cases, it will be known even before litigation
is commenced whether an alleged harasser was a supervisor, and in others, the
alleged harasser's status will become clear to both sides after discovery."). See also
id. at 2454 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("I join the opinion because [the Court's
definition of supervisor"] provides the narrowest and most workable rule for when
an employer may be held vicariously liable for an employee's harassment.")
lintemal citations omitted).
9 Id. at 2443.
'oo Id. at 2450.
'
0
' Id. at 2454.102 id.103 Id.
4 Id. at 2458-59 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
"' Id. at 2455.
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slings and arrows, however, are not so easily avoided. An
employee who confronts her harassing supervisor risks, for
example, receiving an undesirable or unsafe work
assignment or an unwanted transfer. She may be saddled
with an excessive workload or with placement on a shift
spanning hours disruptive to her family life. And she may
be demoted or fired. Facing such dangers, she may be
reluctant to blow the whistle on her superior, whose "power
and authority invests his or her harassing conduct with a
particular threatening character."
10 6
Ginsburg would have given deference to the EEOC's broad
interpretation and argued that the majority's interpretation was out of synch
with modem agency theories. 0 7 Ginsburg contended: "In so restricting the
definition of supervisor, the Court once again shuts from sight the 'robust
protection against workplace discrimination Congress intended Title VII to
secure."' 1 8 Concluding her dissent, Ginsburg called on Congress to
intervene to correct the Court's interpretation like it has been prone to do
with civil rights legislation.'0 9
B. University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar
1. Background
The University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center (Texas
Southwestern) was affiliated with a number of healthcare facilities,
including Parkland Memorial Hospital (Parkland). 110 Under an affiliation
agreement, Parkland agreed to offer empty staff positions to Texas
Southwestern's faculty members; as a result, Texas Southwestern's faculty
filled most of Parkland's staff positions.11 1 Naiel Nassar was an Egyptian-
born, Muslim doctor specializing in internal medicine and infectious
diseases at Texas Southwestern while also serving as a physician at
Parkland.ll 2 Texas Southwestern's Chief of Infectious Disease Medicine,
Dr. Beth Levine, was hired afterwards as Nassar's superior.113 Nassar
believed Levine was discriminating against him because of his religion and
106 Id. at 2456 (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 763
Q1998)).
07 Id. at 2457.
108 Id. at 2462 (quoting Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618,
660 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).9 Id. at 2466.
110 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2523 (2013).
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
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national origin, so he complained to Levine's supervisor, Dr. Gregory
Fitz.l 
4
While trying to negotiate an arrangement where he could continue
working at Parkland without teaching at Texas Southwestern, Nassar
resigned from Texas Southwestern, citing Levine's "religious, racial and
cultural bias against Arabs and Muslims." '" 5 Fitz defended Levine, arguing
she had been publicly humiliated and deserved a public apology from
Nassar. 116 When Fitz learned that Parkland had offered Nassar a staff
physician job, Fitz intervened and Parkland withdrew its offer.'1 7 Nassar
filed suit in federal court, alleging status-based discrimination for Levine's
harassment, as well as retaliation-based harassment by Fitz."H8 The district
court awarded Nassar over $400,000 in back pay and $300,000 in
compensatory damages," 9 and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the retaliation findings, holding that EEOC's motivating factor
standard was sufficient to prove retaliation.
20
2. The Court Adopts the But-For Causation Standard for
Remedy-Based Retaliation Claims
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy noted that Congress often
wrote statutes under the backdrop of common law principles of but-for
causation. 121 In discussing Congress' legisprudence, Kennedy stated, "This
[] is the background against which Congress legislated in enacting Title
VII, and these are the default rules it is presumed to have incorporated,
absent an indication to the contrary in the statute itself.' 122 Kennedy also
offered two insights the Gross Court discussed: one regarding the proper
textual interpretation of "because" for causation purposes and another
regarding Congress' "structural choices in both Title VII itself and the
law's 1991 amendments.' 2 3 Because of Congress' failure to define the
causation standard, Kennedy surmised that the provision warranted the
same prevailing legal standard that existed at the time the Civil Rights Act
was passed.124 Specifically, when Congress passed the Civil Rights Act,
114 Id. For example, Nassar alleged that Levine singled him out for his billing
methods and made derogatory comments about Middle Easterners. Id.
1
'
5 Id. at 2523-24.
Id. at 2524.
117 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id. (citing to Nassar v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., 674 F.3d 448, 454 n. 16 (5th
Cir. 2012) (citing Smith v. Xerox Corp., 602 F.3d 320, 330 (5th Cir. 2010)).
121 Id.
121 Id. at 2533.
123 Id at 2527-28.
124 Id. at 2528.
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causation existed under a but-for standard. 12 5 Therefore, the Court refused
to apply the motivating-factor standard to remedy-based retaliation.126
Kennedy also focused on the deliberate structure of Title VII and
its pattern of defining specific terms in many of its provisions. He reasoned,
"In light of Congress' special care in drawing so precise a statutory scheme,
it would be improper to indulge [Nassar's] suggestion that Congress meant
to incorporate the default rules that apply only when Congress writes a
broad and undifferentiated statute.' ' 127 Kennedy also employed a whole
code interpretive canon by referencing the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990--passed a year before § 2000e-2(m)-which included an express
anti-retaliation provision detailing the applicable causation standard. 2 8 This
bolstered Kennedy's argument that Congress' failure to revise Title VII's
anti-retaliation provision was intentional.2 9
Finally, Kennedy discussed the practical effect of the majority's
narrow reading: the decision would limit the filing of frivolous claims,
"which would siphon resources from efforts by employers ... to combat
workplace harassment.' 30 He imagined a scenario where an employee,
knowing he or she would be fired or demoted, would file a status-based
discrimination claim with the EEOC.' 31 Then, when the employee actually
was fired or demoted, the employee would claim remedy-based
retaliation.1 32 Under the motivating-factor standard, Kennedy believed, this
could unduly increase settlement or trial costs. 1 33 It would also smear the
reputation of an employer whose actions did not actually stem from
discriminatory intent. '14 Ultimately, the Court vacated the Fifth Circuit's
decision and remanded it so the lower court could decide whether Fitz's
intervention was the but-for cause of Nassar's Parkland offer being
rescinded. 135
125 id.
126 Id. ("Given this clear language, it would be improper to conclude that what
Congress omitted from the statute is nevertheless within its scope.").
'7 Id. at 2530-31 (citing Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 175
(2005) (distinguishing Title IX's broadly worded provisions regarding
discrimination from Title VII's finely tailored provisions)).
128 Id. at 2526. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2012).
129 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2531 ("Congress has in explicit terms altered the standard
of causation for one class of claims but not another, despite the obvious opportunity
to do so in the 1991 Act.").130 Id. at 2531-32.
131 Id. at 2532.
132 id.
133 Id. (comparing Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2443-45 (2013)).134 Id. at 2532.
135 Id. at 2534.
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3. The Four Dissenters
Ginsburg criticized Kennedy's approach, claiming it divorced the
concepts of status-based discrimination and retaliation. 36 Noting that "the
fear of retaliation is the leading reason why people stay silent" about
workplace discrimination, Ginsburg argued that discrimination
encompassed forms of retaliation. 37 The Court's decision, Ginsburg
argued, would confuse judges and jurors who will have to apply different
standards to seemingly similar provisions since "because of' has two
different meanings in the same statute.1
38
Ginsburg also argued that the decision undermined the
congressional intent behind the 1991 Act.1 39 She stated, "There is scant
reason to think that, despite Congress' aim to restore and strengthen...
laws that ban discrimination in employment Congress meant to exclude
retaliation claims from the newly enacted motivating factor provision."'
140
Instead, Ginsburg would have given deference to the EEOC's position and
applied the motivating-factor test to remedy-based discrimination.' 41 She
concluded her dissent by calling on Congress to abrogate the decision in the
same way she wanted Congress to overturn Vance.'
42
V. VANCE AND NASSAR'S IMPACT ON SMALL BUSINESSES
A. Small Business Aspects Overlooked by Congress and the Courts
Although Title VII produced great results in bringing equality to
the workplace, it was not meant to inhibit commerce through overly
complex regulatory structures. Specifically, Title VII neither imposes a
"general civility code"' 43 nor protects against the "ordinary tribulations of
the workplace"'44 like isolated abusive language. Instead, Title VII focuses
on avoiding harm rather than providing redress, 45 and the Court has
routinely held that employers must be able to conduct business without
worrying that a slight miscue will crush them under the full weight of Title
36 Id. at 2537 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
137 Id. at 2534-35 (quoting Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson
Cnty., 555 U.S. 271, 279 (2009)) (internal quotations omitted).
138 Id. at 2535.1391d. at 2546 ("It is an odd mode of statutory interpretation that divines Congress'
aim in 1991 by looking to a decision of this Court, Gross, made under a different
statute in 2008, while ignoring the overarching purpose of the Congress that
enacted the 1991 Civil Rights Act.").140Id. at 2539 (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted).
141 Id. at 2540 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
142 Id. at 2547.
143 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
144 BARBARA LINDEMANN & DAVID KADuE, SExuAL HARASSMENT IN
EMPLOYMENT LAW 175 (1992).145 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998) (citations omitted).
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VII. 146 Even courts before Ellerth and Faragher were cognizant that it
would be improper to hold companies liable for the actions of low-level
managers because of functional nomenclature. 147 Nevertheless, Title VII is
the most litigated portion of the Civil Rights Act, 148 and Congress and the
Court often devise legal standards without considering the burden on small
businesses. 149 This divide ignores the modem realities of the small business
community,' 50 though, because it does not consider unique small business
aspects like workplace hierarchies and market constraints. As a result, the
discord between legisprudence and jurisprudence places a substantially
greater burden on small businesses than large corporations.
1. Workplace Hierarchies in Small Businesses
Workplace hierarchies vary widely across the country and between
industries, and small businesses have trended more towards autonomous
teams comprised of "quasioverseer" employees.' 51 As a result, the only
supervisor with the ability to take tangible employment actions in a small
business is usually the owner himself' 52 According to a National
Federation of Independent Business study, sixty-two percent of small
business employees have occasionally exercised supervisory authority
under the EEOC's broad definition, but those same employees were never
able to exercise tangible employment action against co-workers. 53 Thus,
the EEOC's broad definition had christened the majority of small business
employees as supervisors.
Furthermore, small businesses often utilize non-linear management
structures to allow more flexibility with employee schedules. ' 14 Small
businesses typically have an ordinary employee cover for a manager on
duty when that person goes on break.15 However, this covering employee
is never endowed with the ability to take tangible employment action.
156
Other times, employees may be paid slightly more than other co-workers
for reasons unrelated to job responsibilities, like seniority. 57 This increased
146 See Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993) (holding that
"harassing behavior" need not force the victim to leave his or her job, but it cannot
be so attenuated that it causes no identifiable harm. The harassing behavior must be
of such severity or pervasiveness that it pollutes the workplace, thereby "alter[ing]
the conditions of the victim's employment").
147 See, e.g., Saxton v. AT&T, 10 F.3d 526, 536 (7th Cir. 1993).
148 ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 8, at 38.
149 Brief for Nat'l Fed'n Indep. Bus. Small Bus. Legal Ctr. et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent, Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013) (No. 11-
556), 2012 WL 5353863, at 7 [hereinafter NFIB Brief].
150 See id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 NFIB, Business Structure, 4 NAT'L SMALL Bus. POLL 6 (2004).
154 NFIB Brief, supra note 149, at 7.
155 NFIB, supra note 153.
156 Id.157 NFIB Brief, supra note 149, at 11.
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pay is meant to incentivize experienced employees to stay with the small
business, not necessarily to reward them for having a greater grant of
authority from an employer. Under the EEOC's broad definition of
supervisor, every employee in these situations would be at risk of being
considered a supervisor and would increase employer liability costs. 58 If
small businesses were not sure who qualified as a supervisor, they would
potentially spread their limited resources over a wider range than necessary
to create supervisor training programs. This would ultimately result in less
effective screening, training and monitoring of these employees because
comprehensive training modules are more difficult to develop and properly
administer when they must be given to a larger set.' 59 This type of legal
indeterminacy only obstructs small business planning.
2. Market Constraints on Small Businesses
Due to their insular positions in the capital markets, small
businesses also face greater difficulties restructuring compliance initiatives
to comport with shifting legal regimes. Generally speaking, employers need
confidence that judicial decisions will remain intact for a significant periods
of time. Yet only twelve percent of small businesses have at least one
employee whose sole duty is to handle compliance or human resources
developments when the law changes. 60
Moreover, small businesses often lack the resources enjoyed by
large corporations to "parse the language of complicated legal standards
before making decisions that could expose them to significant liability.'
16 1
A corollary of this concern for resource preservation is that small
businesses often rely on the plain meaning of statutes and settled law when
determining how a statute will apply to them, especially if they cannot
afford outside counsel to advise them on how a law may be interpreted.
This reliance arises from the presumption that courts will infer Congress
uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning in the law and that
Congress meant to incorporate these understandings in a statute. 62 Large
corporations, on the other hand, benefit from economies of scale and have
better access to additional capital than small businesses. Large businesses
may reallocate funds from marketing, research or technology, but small
businesses may only have the option of raising prices on consumers to
cover increased litigation costs.
"' See id. at 8.
159 Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent, Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013) (No. 11-556), 2012
WL 5361524, at *10 [hereinafter Chamber of Commerce Vance Briefi.60 NFIB, supra note 153.
161 NFIB Brief, supra note 149, at 2.
162 NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981); see also Meyer v. Holley,
537 U.S. 280, 285 (2003) ("[T]he Court has assumed that, when Congress creates a
tort action, it legislates against a legal background of ordinary tort-related vicarious
liability rules and consequently intends its legislation to incorporate those rules.").
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Also, small businesses often lack the resources necessary to meet
their litigation needs, so when a lawsuit is filed against them, it may cost
small businesses more to defend a claim than to simply settle outside of
court. 163 It costs employers between $4000 and $10,000 to comply with an
EEOC investigation, at least $75,000 to defend a claim on summary
judgment, and between $125,000 and $500,000 to litigate a case before a
jury. 64 As a result, even if a claimant brings a frivolous claim, small
businesses may feel forced to pay more to settle to avoid additional costs
associated with litigation and attorney fees. This is especially true given the
increase in the frequency of retaliation charges in recent years, despite the
fact the EEOC itself has determined many are without merit.165 In 2012
alone, the EEOC determined there was reasonable cause in only 1,800 of
the charges filed with it.166 By contrast, the EEOC determined that 27,077
charges lacked reasonable cause.167 Thus, only six percent of the retaliation
claims brought before the EEOC exhibited some good-faith foundation for
retaliation. If the litigants bypass EEOC intervention, employers must still
face increased litigation costs to defend against the charges. 168 This places
an even greater burden on small businesses struggling after the 2008
financial crisis. 169 Ultimately, the narrow approaches from Vance and
Nassar benefit small businesses because they lead to objective
interpretation and involve facts that were immutable at the time of the
alleged harassment.
170
B. Benefits that Will Inhere to Small Businesses from the Vance and
Nassar Rulings
The threat of vicarious liability causes employers to use their
limited resources to enact preventive policies relating to the employees who
have the greatest potential to abuse their authority: supervisors. 171 By
encouraging employers to focus their preventive efforts on a smaller
subsection of employees, Vance's narrow definition of supervisor promotes
163 STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 878, 880 (8th ed. 2012) (discussing
this concept in the context of mass tort claims).
164 David Sherwyn et al., Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration: A New
Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1579 (2005) (footnote
omitted).
165 Chamber of Commerce Vance Brief, supra note 159, at * 11-12.
166 Id. at *17.
167 id.
168 Id. at *18.
169 Id.
170 See Antonin Scalia, Common-law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 7 (1998) (arguing
that abandoning principles of stare decisis jeopardizes consistent application of the
law to all parties).
171 Chamber of Commerce Vance Brief, supra note 159, at *5.
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avoidance of harassment liability by efficiently allocating resources.
172
Because "employers have greater opportunity and incentive to screen
[supervisors], train them, and monitor their performance," employers have
"a greater opportunity to guard against misconduct by supervisors than by
common workers."'' 73 Under Vance's interpretation of supervisor, small
businesses can estimate their prospective liability based off an employee's
ability to take tangible employment actions, not whether that individual
happens to direct a co-worker on a particular day. Merely allowing an
employee to direct a co-worker's activities will not upgrade an employee to
supervisory status. 174 As the law stands, an employer will have to vest an
employee with plenary authority to take tangible employment actions in
order to subject itself to increased liability. Furthermore, under the Vance
regime, supervisory status will now be determined as a matter of law before
trial commences. 175 The Vance approach also prevents employees from
arguing that an individual was a supervisor one day, but a regular co-
worker the next, which squares with the Court's original reasoning in
Ellerth that "supervisory harassment cases involve misuse of actual power,
not the false impression of its existence."'
' 76
Under Nassar's but-for causation standard for retaliation, an
employer has an easier time showing that other factors led to an adverse
employment action against an employee. Retaliation claims have nearly
doubled in the past fifteen years, from approximately 16,000 claims filed in
1997, to over 31,000 in 2012. '7 In fact, only status-based claims dealing
with race are filed more often, 178 but Title VII litigants often allege
discrimination and retaliation simultaneously. 179 Before Nassar, instead of
plaintiffs proving discrimination, employers had to prove a negative: that
they did not discriminate against the employee. 180 Under the motivating-
factor standard, even when an employer fired an employee for
nondiscriminatory reasons, an employee could still prevail simply by
showing the decision was slightly motivated by retaliation.18' Under
172 See Jodi R. Mandell, Mack v. Otis Elevator: Creating More Supervisors and
More Vicarious Liability for Workplace Harassment, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 521,
549 (2005).
173 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 803 (1998).
174 See Andonissamy v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 547 F.3d 841, 848 (7th Cir. 2008).
175 Mark Phillis & Denise Visconti, The Supreme Court Clarifies Who Is A
Supervisor Under Title VII, LITTLER MENDELSON (June 25, 2013),
http://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/supreme-court-clarifies-who-
supervisor-under-title-vii.
'Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 744 (1998).177 Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2013, EEOC,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited April 17,
2014).
178 Id.
179 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2535 (2013) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
'8 Chamber of Commerce Brief, supra note 165, at 11-12.
181 Id. at 13.
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Nassar, judges will now have clearer standards before sending cases to
juries.182 This reduces the possibility that a jury could find against an
employer, and studies have suggested that juries are more sympathetic to
employers in discrimination cases than in retaliation cases.' 83 Indeed, juries
have sometimes exonerated employers from discrimination charges, only to
find against the employer on retaliation grounds.1
84
Both cases aid employers when it comes to crafting a strategy to
limit their exposure to workplace liability. Under Vance, an employer can
minimize its potential liability by simply limiting the number of employees
it authorizes to take tangible employment actions. Under Nassar, it is much
easier for an employer to present evidence that discrimination was not the
but-for cause of the employee's termination instead of simply a motivating
factor. 85 The practical effect of these narrow, textualist interpretations is
that it favors employers. Specifically, the clear standards set out in Vance
and Nassar also allow small businesses to devote fewer resources to their
legal departments, making the decisions wins for employers. The twin
decisions will ultimately reduce these costs placed on small businesses
faced with combatting discrimination claims and will reduce settlement
values across the board. 186
VI. ADVICE FOR SMALL BUSINESS COUNSEL
Even though the Vance and Nassar decisions are employer-friendly
rulings, small business counsel must remain proactive to protect their
clients' interests. Title VII still encourages employers to craft effective anti-
harassment policies and grievance mechanisms by threatening them with
liability if they are negligent in detecting workplace harassment.
8 7
Harassment victims may still seek a remedy for discrimination, albeit with a
higher burden. As Vance made clear, applying the negligence framework of
liability for non-supervisors provides a sufficient model to evaluate
employer liability without saturating businesses with litigation costs.
88
182 Kevin Russell, Court Rules for Employers in Two Employment Discrimination
Cases, SCOTUSBLOG (June 24, 2013, 3:44 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/court-rules-for-employers-in-two-
employment-discrimination-cases/.
183 Abigail Caplovitz Field, Responding to Retaliation Suits After Vance and
Nassar, CORP. SECRETARY (Sept. 16, 2013),
http://www.corporatesecretary.com/articles/regulation-and-legaUl 2533/responding-
retaliation-lawsuits-after-vance-and-nassar/.
184 Id.
185 Jon D. Bible, Keeping Current: Nassar and Vance: Supreme Court Limits Scope
of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Bus. L. TODAY (Sept. 2013),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam!aba/publications/blt/2013/09/full-issue-
201309.authcheckdam.pdf.
186 Russell, supra note 182.
187 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 759, 764 (1998).
188 Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2448 (2013); see also Mandell,
supra note 172, at 552 ("[T]he [] definition seems to strike a balance between
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Evidence that an employer did not prevent foreseeable harassment
situations, failed to respond to discrimination allegations or did not provide
an adequate grievance filing mechanism could still impart liability on small
businesses.18 9 In fact, plaintiffs were still able to obtain relief in the circuits
that applied the Court's narrow definitions of supervisor and retaliation.1 90
Small business counsel therefore should advise clients to maintain
robust antidiscrimination policies and to regularly educate employees on
workplace harassment awareness. In fact, some states require employers to
provide harassment training to employees.' 9' Even if these are not required
by law, these techniques can often aid an employer in winning dismissal of
a discrimination or retaliation claim in court.192 Some procedures small
business counsel should advise their clients to take are:
(1) Insert arbitration clauses into employment contracts. Small
businesses benefit greatly from the ability to arbitrate claims, and
mandatory arbitration clauses are generally enforceable. 193 Arbitration saves
small businesses valuable litigation resources because it requires fewer
pretrial procedures and limits discovery. 94 Arbitration also allows a small
business to safeguard its reputation'95 by requiring that settlement terms
remain confidential. 196 Overall, inserting mandatory arbitration clauses into
employment contracts allows small businesses to maintain control over
contractual disputes. 9
(2) Review employee job descriptions. Small business entrepreneurs
should review their job descriptions for managers and other employees who
may occasionally oversee the work of others in the company. Position
descriptions should expressly delineate between an employee's ability (or
allowing plaintiffs with strong hostile work environment claims to prevail, and
limiting vicarious liability for the acts of those employees over whom the employer
has sufficient control.").189 Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2453.
190 See, e.g., EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 679 F.3d 657, 684 (8th Cir.
2012) (awarding plaintiff money damages while applying the definition of
"supervisor" upheld in Vance).
'9' See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 26 § 807(3) (1991) (requiring all private or public
employers with fifteen or more employees to provide mandatory sexual harassment
training to all employees or supervisors within one year of starting the position).
192 See, e.g., Brinkley v. Green Bay, 392 F. Supp. 2d 1052 (E.D. Wis. 2005).19' See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
194 Theodore 0. Rogers, Jr., The Procedural Differences Between Litigating in
Court and Arbitration: Who Benefits?, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 633, 639-40
(2001) ("There is no doubt that arbitration is faster on the whole than court ....
With fewer depositions and with faster pre-trial procedures, a proceeding tried to
judgment is much less costly in arbitration than in court.").
95 Amy J. Schmitz, Untangling the Privacy Paradox in Arbitration, 54 U. KAN. L.
REV. 1211, 1224 (2006).
196 Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not
Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 433, 452 (2010).197 id,
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inability) to take tangible employment actions.198 Evidence of employee job
descriptions can mitigate factual disputes about whether an employee is a
supervisor under the Vance interpretation of the term.199
(3) Revisit anti-harassment policies. Most employees'
understanding of workplace discrimination comes not from reading about
recent legal developments, but from their employers' corporate policies. 200
In fact, some scholars consider the popularity of internal corporate policies
to be the most significant development in employment discrimination in the
last two decades.0 Some employers define discrimination more broadly
than the legal definitions of discrimination because they have often
included situations that seem like harassment to a lay person but extend
beyond the legal contours of discrimination.20 2 Employers take these
prophylactic measures in order to minimize their liability, even if it may
create an impression in employees' minds that Title VII protections are
broader than the law actually allows. 3 Notwithstanding this seeming
reliance, though, employees who wish to argue that their employer's policy
incentivized them to report supposed misconduct often cannot use this
subjective evidence in court.2°
Additionally, anti-harassment policies play a role in cases where
plaintiffs are seeking punitive damages. In order to recover punitive
damages under Title VII, a claimant bears the burden of showing the
employer acted with a reckless disregard towards employee rights.20 5
However, employers can rebut this evidence by simply showing they have
adopted anti-harassment policies and educated their employees about their
Title VII protections.20 6
Furthermore, studies indicate that the EEOC is significantly less
likely to find "cause" in discrimination allegations when employers have
anti-harassment policies than if they do not.207 Thus, demonstrating a
visible commitment to preventing discrimination can reduce an employer's
198 Julia E. Judish et al., Impact of Supreme Court Pro-Employer Title VII
Decisions Blunted by State Laws, 39 EMP. REL. L.J. (2013).
199 Id.
200 Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation in an EEO World, 89 IND. L.J. 115, 116 (2014).
201 See id at 128, 131 n.94 (arguing that the propagation of employer policies was
not merely a reaction to developments in employment law, but also a driving force
in the law's development).
202 Brake, supra note 200, at 119 ("EEO policies need not track legal
nondiscrimination rights, and often merge broader promises and fairness with
nondiscrimination guarantees.").203 Chamber of Commerce Vance Brief, supra note 159, at *21.
204 Brake, supra note 200, at 118.
205 Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999).
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207 See Elizabeth Hirsh & Sabino Kornrich, The Context of Discrimination:
Workplace Conditions, Institutional Environments, and Sex and Race
Discrimination Charges, 113 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 1394, 1424-25 (2008).
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liability. 208 Ultimately, effective corporate policies can help small
businesses establish that any perceived discrimination or retaliation was
unintentional.20 9
(4) Encourage grievance reporting. Title VII compliance also
depends upon the willingness of employers to establish effective grievance
reporting protocols and the willingness of employees to file complaints and
assist in investigations.10 Small businesses should encourage employees to
file grievance reports to a person higher than the co-worker who oversees
their work production if they believe they are the victim of
21discrimination. It is important that employers encourage employees to
report any instances of perceived harassment in clear and precise terms. 12
Once a grievance procedure is in place, the small business must ensure that
it is effectively followed, too. Having a grievance reporting procedure that
is never followed increases the chances that an employee would forego
internal complaint channels, thereby eroding the small business' reputation
if the case goes to trial.213
Grievance procedures are the most rational way for employers to
insulate themselves from liability.214 Nearly ninety-five percent of
employers already have grievance procedures in place for reporting
215harassment. Most employees first attempt to negotiate with employers,
but even if they do wish to lodge a formal complaint, they often do so using
their employers' grievance procedures.2 16 Furthermore, courts have
generally offered a lower level of protection to employees who use an
employer's internal channels for reporting harassment than those who lodge
complaints through external channels like the EEOC.217
(5) Supplement anti-harassment policies and grievance procedures
with employee training programs. Employers should have an express
antidiscrimination policy and should implement this policy through various
training programs. But a small business cannot simply glance over its anti-
retaliation message during training sessions; it needs to be evident
208 C. Elizabeth Hirsh, Settling for Less? Organizational Determinants of
Discrimination-Charged Outcomes, 42 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 239 (2008).
209 Field, supra note 183.
210 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2537 (2013) (Ginsburg,
J. dissenting).Huston v. Proctor & Gamble Paper Prods. Corp., 568 F.3d 100, 108-09 (3d Cir.
2009). See also EEOC v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 521 F.3d 306, 320 (4th Cir. 2008)
(holding an employer negligent in preventing harassment because it "was
? racticing something akin to willful blindness").
2 Brake, supra note 200, at 119.
213 Field, supra note 183.
214 Lauren B. Edelman, Rivers of Law and Contested Terrain: A Law and Society
Approach to Economic Rationality, 38 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 181, 190 (2004).2r'Brake, supra note 200, at 131 n.94.
216 Id. at 133.
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throughout the entire antidiscrimination training.218  Generally,
antidiscrimination trainings should educate employees on how to identify,
report and prevent harassment.21 9
Although it may be expensive for small businesses to hold trainings
for all employees every year, small businesses can utilize more cost-
effective techniques such as handing out a simple reminder of the
company's anti-harassment policy or sending company-wide emails 2 0 The
employer can also post signs around the employee break room that
emphasize the importance of a harassment-free work environment. 221 Some
small businesses have even begun utilizing "burst learning" by sending out
short videos several times a year that remind employees of the company's
values and policies.
222
(6) Respond promptly to discrimination allegations and comply
with EEOC investigations. Small business employers should respond to
harassment complaints immediately, usually by launching an internal
2231 hinvestigation into the matter. When the investigation is underway, the
employer should document all discussions about its course of action, as
well as its reasoning for each action.224 This creates a track record for the
employer's benefit if it must present evidence that its decision was not the
determinative factor in firing or demoting the employee-especially if the
litigant lodges another complaint against an employee during this
investigation period.22 5 Managers should also avoid discussions with the
alleged victim that could be seen as an attempt to obstruct an EEOC
investigation. 26
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While an investigation is in progress, the employer should move
the complainant to another department. If that is not possible, the employer
should make every attempt to have the alleged victim and alleged harasser
work during different shifts.227 Finally, the employer should refrain from
simply firing the alleged offender, as this may give the alleged harasser
cause to file a wrongful termination claim.228
(7) Be aware of Title VII state and local analogs. The narrower
treatment of supervisor liability and retaliation protection may push some
plaintiffs to seek recourse using state equivalents instead of or in addition to
Title VII when the state or local law offers more favorable legal standards
to employees. 229 An employee who sees his or her federal claim fail may
still find relief under state law. For example, California's Title VII
equivalent, the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), statutorily
defines supervisory status more broadly than the Vance Court.2 30 FEHA
considers an individual a supervisor if the employee: (1) can take tangible
employment actions against an employee; (2) has the authority to "assign,
reward, or discipline" other employees; or (3) has been imbued with the
"responsibility to direct" other employees.2 3' California courts have also
interpreted FEHA's overarching purpose broadly to protect an employee's
right to work in a non-hostile environment.232
Similarly, some state and local laws have provided for a broader
scope of causation in retaliation cases. The District of Columbia Human
Rights Act, for instance, allows a plaintiff in a state law retaliation case to
prevail simply by proving that retaliation was a motivating factor in the
employer's actions, regardless of legitimate business reasons.233 Therefore,
employers should remain vigilant and not relax their corporate policies. If
the small business operates solely or primarily in one jurisdiction, small
business counsel should advise the employer it should consider
incorporating these state law standards into its anti-harassment policies and
training modules.
VII. CONCLUSION
Small businesses are acutely affected by the discord between
Congress' legisprudence and the Court's jurisprudence in the Title VII
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228 Joseph J. Ward, A Callfor Price Waterhouse II. The Legacy of Justice
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Discrimination Claims, 61 ALB. L. REv. 627, 659 (1997) ("Excessive
discrimination claims bind employers by forcing them to divert their resources,
thereby reducing their efficiency.").
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arena. Small businesses are often asked to bear equally the brunt of all
consequences that changing legal regimes also create for large corporations
despite having different workplace hierarchies and market constraints.
However, two recent Title VII decisions by the Court have narrowed the
scope of employer liability and are undoubtedly wins for small business
employers. In Vance, the Court limited vicarious liability to those
supervisors that are authorized to take tangible employment actions against
employees. And in Nassar, the Court endorsed the but-for standard of
causation in remedy-based retaliation claims. The combined effect of these
decisions will benefit small businesses by reducing litigation costs and
preventing claims from reaching juries. Nevertheless, small business
owners must remain proactive in stamping out workplace hostilities by
having robust anti-harassment procedures. Once small businesses are able
to effectively protect their corporate assets, they can then turn their
attention to more important matters: making a profit.

